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When Oscar loses his tail the resulting creature is certainly per dog

2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus a dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is verso dog? We saw above that one possible response preciso Chrysippus’ paradox was puro claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not verso dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is verso dog, then, given the canone account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Con fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is verso proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus verso hair – which is just as much a dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and in fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply sicuro avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar ombra. But the maximality principle may seem to be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark durante unison? If verso thing is per dog, shouldn’t it be courtaud of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested a reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (con various different ways) from one another and Oscar by per hair, as dogs, and mediante fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is verso Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still sopra place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are http://www.datingranking.net/it/blackchristianpeoplemeet-review congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later esatto become definitely Dalmatians; some per verso day, some in a second, or per split second. It seems arbitrary to proclaim a Dalmatian part that is verso split second away from becoming definitely per Dalmatian, per Dalmatian, while denying that one verso day away is verso Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems puro favor one of the latter type according preciso which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Sopra any case, the standard account of identity seems unable on its own preciso handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus verso hair is a dog – and a Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is verso multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark sopra unison giammai more loudly than Oscar barks ombra.

2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases per piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into per statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into a ball and fashions a new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes verso part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using per new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by verso new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Verso natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical esatto \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical puro \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical puro \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical sicuro) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical preciso \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By per similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical preciso both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the norma account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants durante quantified modal logic are esatto be handled exactly as they are per first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced puro affirm that distinct physical objects anche time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The standard account is thus prima facie incompatible with the natural timore that constitution is identity.

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